Ahmadinejad, Iran, and foreign policy dysfunction in Tajikistan by Clark, Brenton
Ahmadinejad, Iran and Foreign
Policy Dysfunction in Tajikistan
Brenton Clark*
Throughout the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Tajikistan became, on the
surface at least, an increasingly important political partner to Iran. Tajikistan
according to Ahmadinejad was a “strategic partner” and in fact the two states’
“common history and culture” made them inseparable. Ahmadinejad’s emphasis on
Tajikistan within Iran’s broader foreign policy led to considerable discussion among
regional observers and analysts who declared that the relationship between Iran and
Tajikistan could potentially develop into a so-called “Persian alliance,” which could
then reorder the regional political balance. However, lying just below the surface of
relations between Iran and Tajikistan was a disjuncture between rhetoric and reality.
This article argues that despite the public amity that existed between the two states,
strong and substantive Iran-Tajik relations were not achieved by the close of
Ahmadinejad’s presidency. This was due in part to a dysfunctional Iranian foreign
policy approach, which often led to the mismanagement of this interstate relationship.
This factor along with the unwillingness of Tajik elites to go from words to deeds and
the broader impact of sanctions, international isolation, and regional rivalry, meant
that Iran was largely unable to fulfill its prominent political and economic objectives
in Tajikistan.
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Introduction
The presidential election victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005 her-alded a sea change in the politics of Iran. Ahmadinejad’s populist,
nationalist rhetoric, and confrontational stance on a range of political issues
indicated that a major shift was about to take place in how Iran conducted
itself on the international stage. Ahmadinejad’s often antagonistic approach
to international relations while bringing about a much more assertive Iranian
foreign policy position, also instituted a pattern of crisis that would see the
imposition of further economic sanctions and increased international
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isolation. Rather than providing the Iranian people with a grand and prosper-
ous future, Ahmadinejad brought only further economic hardship domesti-
cally, and an erosion of Iran’s strategic and political position internationally
(Habibi, 2013, pp. 1–8).
Iran’s relations with Tajikistan during this period cannot be removed from
this pattern of crisis and international tension in Iran’s foreign relations.
Iran’s growing isolation on the international stage and its increasingly hostile
relationship with the West had an immense impact on the trajectory of Iran’s
relations with Tajikistan. Both out of necessity in the face of ever mounting
sanctions and international isolation stemming from the West, and out of
choice due to Ahmadinejad’s emphasis on “Looking East” to fulfill Iran’s for-
eign policy agenda, Tajikistan became, on the surface at least, an increasingly
important political partner to Iran (Vakil, 2006, pp. 51–65). Ahmadinejad
devoted significant attention to building relations with Tajikistan. Tajikistan
according to Ahmadinejad was a “strategic partner,” and in fact, the two
states’ “common history and culture” made them inseparable (Sodiqov,
2011a, p. 19). Backing this rhetorical flourish, Ahmadinejad made a special
effort to ensure that Tajikistan would be front and center of his regional for-
eign policy approach, visiting the country and meeting its president Emomalii
Rahmon on an almost annual basis.1 Ahmadinejad’s efforts toward Tajikistan
led to considerable discussion among regional observers and analysts who
declared that the relationship between Iran and Tajikistan could potentially
develop into a so-called “Persian alliance,” which could reorder the regional
political balance (Francois, 2010). However, lying just below the surface of
relations between Iran and Tajikistan was an incredible disjuncture between
rhetoric and reality.
This article argues that despite the public amity that existed between the
two states throughout Ahmadinejad’s presidency, strong and substantive
Iran-Tajik relations were not achieved due in part to a dysfunctional Iranian
foreign policy approach, which often led to the mismanagement of this inter-
state relationship. This factor along with the unwillingness of Tajik elites to
go from words to deeds and the broader impact of sanctions, international
isolation, and regional rivalry meant that Iran was largely unable to fulfill its
prominent political and economic objectives in Tajikistan.
A Brief History of Iranian Engagement in Post-Soviet Tajikistan
The fall of the Soviet Union in late 1991 brought excited hope within Iran’s
political establishment that close political, economic, and cultural links could
be established with the five post-Soviet republics. In particular, the Iranian
government focused much of its attention toward Tajikistan, which was
viewed by many within the Iranian government as a “Persian” state that
would naturally gravitate to Iran on account of thousands of years of shared
linguistic, cultural, and societal relations (Atkin, 2013, pp. 361–376). Despite
Tajikistan lacking the economic and political weight of other newly independ-
ent post-Soviet Central Asian republics such as Turkmenistan and Kazakh-
stan, Iranian foreign officials enthusiastically proposed a range of cultural,
economic, and political programs that would reconnect Tajikistan with Iran
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after the so-called 70-year “disruption” of relations caused by Soviet rule
(“Iran’s Maleki”, 1992). As aptly summed up by Djalili and Grare, although
Tajikistan was geographically and politically “remote,” Iran was “very sensi-
tive to everything that had to do with Tajikistan, because of the cultural, his-
toric and above all linguistic affinities” that were perceived to have existed
between these two societies (Djalili & Grare, 1998, p. 127). Within days of
independence, the Tajik government received a number of Iranian political
and economic proposals that ranged from the establishment of Persian lan-
guage schools and facilities, regular air links between Iranian cities and Dush-
anbe, the building of highways which would eventually connect Iran’s
eastern provinces to Tajikistan, and the establishment of commercial deals
with Iranian private enterprises seeking new markets and new opportunities.
These efforts to “re-establish” ties between Iran and Tajikistan were according
to Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister of the time, Abbas Maleki, a “natural con-
tinuation” of the common history that existed between the two states (“Iran’s
Maleki,” 1992).
However, the great hopes for a close partnership between Iran and Tajiki-
stan were dashed by the serious instability that wracked Tajikistan in the
months leading up to and following independence. Worsening economic con-
ditions in Tajikistan, increased freedom of expression brought about by Soviet
central reforms, and poor governance had contributed to a political environ-
ment whereby multiple groups and actors jockeyed for power over the crum-
bling Tajik state. Throughout the second half of 1991, protesters filled the
streets of Tajikistan’s capital Dushanbe as opposition groups of various ideo-
logical and regional stripes sought to challenge central Soviet control in the
country. By May 1992, Tajikistan had plunged into civil war between those
who supported the Communist political status quo and a fractious opposition
made up of regional and local groups, Islamists, and democrats.2 The opposi-
tion briefly took control of the Tajik capital Dushanbe but by the close of 1992
had been pushed back by the combined weight of pro-Communist forces sup-
ported by Russia and Uzbekistan.
The defeat of the opposition and the rise to power of Emomalii Rahmon
seriously undermined Iran’s relationship with Tajikistan. Iran was frequently
accused by the Tajik government of supporting the opposition groups, in par-
ticular the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP). Indeed, such accusations were
well-founded. Iran had provided financial and material support to not only
the IRP, but also a number of other opposition groups who had briefly taken
control of the Tajik capital. However, as highlighted by Mesbahi, Iran’s
“overall policy” toward the opposition and in particular its support of the
most prominent opposition group - the IRP -, could be “characterized as
skeptical optimism, reflecting skepticism in practice and substance and opti-
mism in the realm of possibilities” (Mesbahi, 1994, p. 126). According to Mes-
bahi (1994), Iran’s support of the IRP in particular was “hesitant if not
passive” and this hesitation was a reflection of Iran’s awareness that the
“clash in Tajikistan, as elsewhere in Central Asia, while couched in ideologi-
cal terms, reflected tribal, regional, and ethnic differences, rather than an
immediate receptivity to an Islamic alternative” (p. 126). Although a number
of IRP figures had declared their intention to establish an “Islamic State,”
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Iranian elites were well aware of the ideological fissures that existed between
their own Shi’a Islamic revolution and the Sunni inspired ideology of the
IRP.3 Furthermore they felt that the group was “unready” to pursue such an
agenda and was using Islam in the service of a very narrow, subregionalist
set of goals.4
Alongside this acknowledgment of the ideological weaknesses that existed
within the IRP, Iran viewed maintaining friendly relations with Russia as the
ultimate priority when dealing with Tajikistan and Central Asia. Iran was
always hesitant to provide too much support to the opposition in the face of
its much more important relations with Russia, who continued to act as the
Tajik government’s political and security guarantor. This “Russo-centrism” in
Iranian foreign policy was an acknowledgment of Russia’s historical interests
in Tajikistan and the wider region (Mesbahi, 1994, p. 128). Furthermore, Ira-
nian policy planners feared that a strong attempt to increase their state’s
influence in Tajikistan by overtly supporting the opposition groups, particu-
larly the IRP, would antagonize Russia’s political leadership who could quite
easily shut the door on cooperation in other facets of the two states’ relations
(Freedman, 2000, p. 69). In particular, Russian arms sales and support for
Iran’s nuclear program were seen as a top priority that could not be sacrificed
for the sake of supporting a ragtag opposition, in the somewhat politically
and geographically peripheral Tajikistan.5 Support for the opposition would
therefore engender a difficult balancing act for Tehran. For instance, if Iran
provided too much support to the opposition, or openly and aggressively
undermined Tajikistan’s new regime, Tehran’s substantive links with Mos-
cow, which had already been placed in jeopardy in the preceding months
due to Iran’s support of the opposition, could be permanently damaged, thus
impacting Iran’s broader regional position. However, if Iran did not provide
enough support to the opposition it would be pilloried at home, and have its
legitimacy as the center for worldwide Islamic activism increasingly ques-
tioned, something that had already occurred with the radical press attacking
Rafsanjani and the foreign ministry’s “mishandling” and lack of support
given to the opposition in Tajikistan.6
Nevertheless, the opposition by the end of 1992 was in tatters. With the
conflict heading toward a virtual stalemate, the Iranian government under
the leadership of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani sought to work closely with the
Russian government in putting an end to the conflict in Tajikistan. Iranian
officials based in Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Iran applied significant pres-
sure on opposition figures to negotiate and compromise with the Rahmon
government and after a number of fitful starts, nine rounds of peace negotia-
tions took place over three years between the opposition and the Tajik gov-
ernment, with both sides signing a power-sharing arrangement in 1997 (Iji,
2001). Iran sought to play a central role in the mediation process and
remained a patron to the Tajik opposition throughout these negotiations.
Iran’s consistent efforts to both encourage and cajole the opposition into
engaging in peace talks with the Rahmon government earned the country
considerable praise. However, question marks remained over Iran’s conduct
in the violent events that led to the civil war in Tajikistan. A number of Tajik
government figures believed that Iran’s encouragement and support for the
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opposition had led to the outbreak of violence in the country and had pro-
longed the hostilities.7 Although this view remains prevalent in certain seg-
ments of Tajikistan’s political elite, Iran’s support for the opposition should
not be overstated and cannot be considered to have been at a level that could
have drastically changed the events and outcomes of the civil war in Tajiki-
stan, a conflict whose basis lay almost entirely in the regional and local ten-
sions that existed within Tajikistan at the time of the Soviet collapse.
While Iran had played a major political role in Tajikistan during the civil
war, and was particularly influential with the Tajik opposition, broader ties
between the two states remained limited. For instance, in 1997 Iranian-Tajik
trade ties stood at USD 32 million, with Iran’s share of Tajikistan’s total trade
turnover constituting just 7% (United Nations Comtrade, 2014). Furthermore,
beyond the fields of economics and trade, other measures of Iran’s interac-
tions with Tajik society also remained low. For instance, very few Tajiks
undertook study in Iranian higher education institutions; the early Iranian
encouragement for Tajiks to take up the Arabic script in place of Cyrillic had
fallen by the wayside, and air routes between the two countries were patchy
and irregular.8 The low level of ties between the two states was of course not
surprising. Throughout the civil war period it was almost impossible for Iran
to deal with Tajikistan in what could be considered a “normal political
setting” and in light of the problematic circumstances within Tajik domestic
society, the very minor outcomes of Iran’s engagement were, if anything,
commendable.
With the end of the Tajik Civil War coinciding with the election of a new
Iranian president, Mohammed Khatami (1997–2005), there was renewed hope
that Iran’s relations with Tajikistan would finally reach their full potential.
However, Tajikistan and the wider Central Asian region rarely rated a men-
tion within Khatami’s broader foreign policy approach (Dunn, 1997, p. 27;
Robin, 1997, p. 7). Instead, Khatami declared that the centerpiece of his for-
eign policy would be an effort to seek detente with the United States and the
“West,” based on a number of normative themes, the most prominent of
which was an effort to engage in an apparent “Dialogue of Civilizations.”9
Unfortunately, while Khatami pursued his lofty internationalist agenda, Taji-
kistan with its weakened economy and fragile post-civil war political and
security situation was a secondary element within Iran’s foreign policy.
This political neglect of Tajikistan would come to an abrupt end, however,
following the geopolitical shift brought about by the attacks of September 11,
2001 (9/11). 9/11 highlighted the potential for Tajikistan to become a strategi-
cally and politically significant actor in the U.S. efforts to rid neighboring
Afghanistan of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Tajikistan’s President Rahmon
rushed to declare that Tajikistan was “in solidarity with the United States
people” (“Tajikistan to Cooperate With U.S.,” 2001). By the close of 2001, Taji-
kistan had provided airfields for U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) operations in Afghanistan, overflight rights for American military
aircraft, and had even broached the possibility of the permanent stationing of
U.S. troops in the country (Jonson, 2006, p. 58). As a reward for Tajikistan’s
loyalty in the “War on Terror”, the country received substantial economic aid
and security assistance. For instance, the United States increased its aid
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budget significantly from 72 million USD in 2001 to 162 million USD in 2002
(Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, 2002, 2003). Furthermore, the U.S.
newfound presence in Tajikistan also paved the way for the country’s acces-
sion into NATO’s Partnership for Peace program and the development of
close military collaboration between the two countries’ militaries (North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2002).
Tajikistan sought to use this new American interest to exact much needed
economic rents, while lowering, yet maintaining Russia’s ongoing influence
and interest in the country.10 Furthermore, the Tajik leadership recognized
early on that cooperation with the United States could not only reshape what
up to that point had been an imbalanced and overwhelmingly dependent
relationship with Russia, but could also provide it with the leverage neces-
sary to “implement a policy of reaching out to the world. . .pursuing a kind
of multivector policy, which it had previously been unable to pursue” (Jon-
son, 2006, p. 59). Using and building upon its newfound importance to the
United States and the West, Rahmon elucidated a foreign policy approach
which would be based on an “open-door policy,” whereby Tajikistan would
cooperate with any state who was willing to cooperate with it, above all in
the field of economics. Tajikistan was mindful that diversifying its relations
with as many international partners as possible would ensure its stability and
provide it much needed breathing room in its international affairs (Jonson,
2006).
This newfound Tajik confidence and assertiveness on the international
stage, along with the presence of Iran’s major political rival the United States
within Tajikistan and the wider region, initially acted as a lightning rod for
Iranian-Tajik relations in the post-9/11 period. Prior to 9/11, Iran could
afford to pay only a cursory glance to a poorer cousin, which lacked substan-
tial strategic, economic, and political weight. However, with the United
States—Iran’s main political rival—seeking to influence the political trajectory
of Tajikistan, a drastic reinvigoration of Iranian foreign policy would be
required.
In attempting to build Iran’s influence in the post-9/11 period, Khatami
placed a particular focus on economic diplomacy, providing funding for
large-scale infrastructure projects such as the construction of the five-km long
Anzob tunnel, which would link Dushanbe through the Hissar Ranges to the
northern region of Sughd (formerly Khojand). The Khatami government had
pledged to provide USD 31.2 million of the estimated USD 110 million cost of
the project, consisting of USD 10 million as a grant, and USD 21.2 million as
a loan (Sanaei, 2011, p. 191). Constructing the tunnel was viewed by the Tajik
government as a major economic and strategic priority. For a large portion of
the year, Tajikistan was geographically split in two due to winter snowfalls,
avalanches, and the decision by the Uzbek government to unilaterally close
road and rail lines connecting Tajikistan with its northern province.11
The most prominent infrastructure project that Iran committed to, however,
was the construction of the Sangtuda 2 hydroelectric station. The Sangtuda
hydroelectric project initially began construction during the 1980s and was origi-
nally envisaged to consist of two hydroelectric power plants, Sangtuda 1, which
would have an energy output of 671 MW and the smaller Sangtuda 2 with a
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capacity of 220 MW (Tajikistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011, pp. 4–5). How-
ever, due to financing issues and the chaos wrought by the civil war, the project
remained unfinished throughout the 1990s. As a consequence, Tajikistan’s elec-
tricity production sat well below domestic consumption levels throughout the
postindependence period, with large swathes of the country suffering from fre-
quent blackouts and limited daily supplies of electricity, serving as a major drag
on the country’s continued economic development. Iran’s willingness to invest
in large-scale infrastructure projects in Tajikistan marked not only a qualitative
but also a quantitative improvement in the two states’ economic engagement.
From the close of 2001–2005 total trade between Iran and Tajikistan increased
from a lowly USD 36.95 million to a respectable USD 104.7 million, with Iran
becoming Tajikistan’s fourth largest import partner (Observatory of Economic
Complexity, 2014).
Although Iran had managed to increase its economic presence, there still
remained a long way to go before Iran could be considered a prominent politi-
cal and security actor in Tajikistan. Indeed Iran’s focus on economic diplomacy
in Tajikistan had led to a much greater and well developed level of interstate
dialogue and interaction between the two states’ political elites, which was evi-
denced by the many meetings and summits held between the two states follow-
ing 9/11. Overall, however Tajikistan remained largely peripheral to Iran in its
wider foreign policy stance, particularly when considered in light of Afghani-
stan where Iran had committed hundreds of millions of dollars in aid and had
actively attempted to undermine the U.S. military and political presence.12 Fur-
thermore, Iran continued its deference to Moscow when it came to Tajikistan,
unquestionably supporting Russia’s position as the key security guarantor of
Tajikistan, and was almost never willing to challenge Russia’s central political
role in the country (Smith, 2002, p. 1). Iran also displayed a reluctance to fully
back Tajikistan in its ongoing disputes with Uzbekistan, despite the fact that
Uzbekistan had thrown its full support behind the U.S. “War on Terror” and
had not only placed Tajikistan in a geopolitical bind by blocking most trade
routes into the country, but had also endorsed American containment policies
toward Iran. Instead, Khatami refused to openly criticize Uzbekistan and had
actively sought to develop close political and economic relations with the Kari-
mov regime (“Uzbek and Iranian Presidents,” 2002).
A number of Iranian elites were highly critical of Khatami’s lack of engage-
ment in Tajikistan and the wider Central Asian region, particularly in the
years leading up to 9/11. For instance, prominent Iranian academician Farhad
Atai declared that there was an “absence of modern ideas and innovative
thinking in the execution of Iran’s policies in the region” (Atai, 2000, p. 119).
Meanwhile, in 2001, Iranian parliamentarian and Central Asian expert, Elaleh
Koolaee felt that Iran’s policies in Central Asia were:
Perhaps one of the most vivid pieces of evidence of the failure of the
foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran . . .we have not been able
to take sound advantage of the opportunities created. . .the signifi-
cance of the region was not properly appreciated despite the attention
we emphatically underlined in our approach towards our northern
borders in recent years. (quoted in Athary, 2001, p. 4)
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Although Iran had made significant headway in Tajikistan by contributing
to the country’s much needed economic revitalization, overall Iran’s inatten-
tiveness had left it as a secondary player that had not fulfilled its political
potential in a region it apparently felt “preeminently a part of” (Maleki, 2007,
p. 176).
A New President and a New Approach in Tajikistan?
The presidential election victory of Ahmadinejad in 2005 heralded what
could be considered a major shift in Iranian foreign policy. Khatami’s eight-
year struggle to bring about rapprochement with the West and his efforts to
improve Iran’s international image had largely come to naught. Abandoning
what he considered to be an exercise in futility, Iran’s new president pursued
with vigor a foreign policy approach that focused heavily on defending Iran’s
right to develop a nuclear program, and which gave much greater attention to
building relations with Iran’s eastern neighbors and the “anti-imperialist”
global south. In the eyes of Ahmadinejad, no longer was Iran willing to sacri-
fice its national interests in the pursuit of better relations with the West, and
countering Washington-led containment efforts became an “objective for Teh-
ran in its own right” (Maleki, 2007, p. 170). Iranian policy planners sought to
find new ways to frustrate the U.S. agendas, and solidify and expand their
country’s influence and interests both regionally and internationally.
A key aspect of these efforts was improving Iran’s bilateral ties with the
Central Asian republics, while also solidifying Iran’s already extensive coop-
eration with India, China, and Russia. Iranian policy planners believed that
developing positive relations with its Eastern neighbors could allow their
country to circumvent growing American economic and political pressure,
provide significant economic benefits, and could also eventually lead to the
creation of a countervailing bloc of states, which would undermine and bring
to an end American unipolarity (Dorraj & Entessar, 2013).13 Although these
ideas were not new and preceded Ahmadinejad’s presidency, it can be
argued that throughout his two terms in office, Ahmadinejad sought to re-
center Iran’s foreign policy from focusing much of its attention toward the
West, to engaging much more actively with the East (Dorraj & Entessar,
2013). Ahmadinejad’s prominent and frequent visits to the Central Asian
republics and his consistent efforts to gain full member status within regional
institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization attest to the
increased importance placed on the region during his presidency (Peyrouse
& Ibraimov, 2010). Furthermore, Iran’s increasingly close ties with China also
placed Central Asia in a much more prominent position within its foreign
policy thinking (Mackenzie, 2010). Both Iran and China proposed the devel-
opment of a series of roads, rail lines, and gas and oil pipelines, which would
criss-cross Central Asia, thus requiring a much greater Iranian focus upon its
Central Asian neighbors.
This attention on the East became an even greater necessity as Ahmadine-
jad’s bellicose rhetoric and conflictual stance toward Israel, and aggressive
defense of Iran’s nuclear program created an ever growing international con-
sensus that Iran had to be punished for its apparent intransigence. The regime
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of sanctions upon Iran grew increasingly suffocating into Ahmadinejad’s sec-
ond term and by 2012 Iran had become largely isolated from the international
banking system, making it almost impossible for Iran to sell its oil and receive
direct foreign investment in a financially interlinked world (“The Lengthening
List,” 2013). The severe sanctions regime had a crippling impact upon an
already weakened Iranian economy and further underscored the vital need for
Iran to diversify its international partners (Cordesman, Bosserman, & Khazai,
2012; “Q&A: Iran Sanctions,” 2013).
The impact of sanctions on Iran’s economy was acknowledged by President
Ahmadinejad who declared in 2012, that the cumulative weight of unilateral
American and international sanctions amounted to “the heaviest economic
onslaught on a nation in history. . .everyday all our banking and trade activities
and our agreements are being monitored and blocked” (Zakaria, 2012). It was in
this context of increasingly severe political and economic isolation that Ahmadi-
nejad sought to forge a close relationship with Tajikistan. However, as will be
shown, this relationship would be held hostage to international and regional
events, as well as Iran’s inability to fulfill its ambitious economic, political, and
cultural agendas.
Ahmadinejad Comes to Dushanbe
Ahmadinejad made his first state visit to Tajikistan in July 2006 for a meet-
ing with his Afghan and Tajik presidential counterparts. During the visit
Ahmadinejad promulgated a range of Iranian investment projects and initia-
tives, and notably promised substantial Iranian assistance to its so-called
“close cultural cousin,” Tajikistan. This first visit to Tajikistan by Ahmadine-
jad would not only be an instructive example of the Iranian president’s
approach to Tajikistan but also of the inherent challenges faced in wider
Iranian-Tajik relations.
Arriving in Dushanbe to a rousing public reception, Ahmadinejad inaugu-
rated the opening of the Anzob tunnel, a project which had originally been
launched by his predecessor, Khatami. Poor workmanship by the Iranian
state-owned company Sobir had plagued construction of the tunnel since
2003 and had led Tajik locals to nickname Anzob, “the tunnel of death” due
to its almost nonexistent ventilation and lighting, alongside its poorly main-
tained road surface that was often waterlogged and badly potholed due to
groundwater that would flood from the tunnel’s crudely sealed walls.14 Many
Tajik experts interviewed by the author blamed both governments for what
one scholar claimed to be a “nightmare” in the building of Anzob, that at the
time of writing still has not been completed. However, much of the fault was
laid squarely at Iran, which was seen to have mismanaged the project and
had not carried through with its political and economic promises. Neverthe-
less despite these criticisms (which were repeated by a number of other Tajik
experts), the opening of Anzob was rushed ahead to provide Ahmadinejad
with the public relations boon he so often desired. Casting aside, or at least
ignoring, the unfinished and poorly constructed nature of the tunnel, Ahma-
dinejad bathed in the glow of this Iranian engineering achievement, boasting
in front of a crowd of Tajiks Iran’s role in securing their future independence
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and sovereignty by constructing a tunnel, which would vitally connect Dush-
anbe to its northern regions. Furthermore, Ahmadinejad blithely declared to
the Tajik crowd, “I look at you and I see Iranians” and that “the tears of hap-
piness I see in your eyes are our happiness too” and highlighted his wish to
see closer relations develop between the peoples of the two states (Golovina,
2006).
Following the opening of the Anzob tunnel Ahmadinejad proceeded to
undertake discussions with Tajik president Rahmon who he had previously
met in Tehran in January of the same year. According to a number of the
U.S. diplomatic cables, which were released by WikiLeaks in 2010, senior
Tajik officials expressed significant discomfort and worries toward Ahmadi-
nejad’s visit to Dushanbe. In private discussions with U.S. diplomatic offi-
cials, and with the U.S. Ambassador to Tajikistan, Richard Hoagland, the
Director of the of the Tajik President’s Strategic Research Centre, Suhrob
Sharipov acknowledged that Tajikistan did not wish to have its international
reputation sullied by politically engaging too closely with Iran. However,
Sharipov also noted that Tajikistan desperately required foreign investment,
and therefore, welcomed Iranian economic assistance (Hoagland, 2006e). Such
a stance was also confirmed by Tajik Foreign Minister Talbak Nazarov who
bluntly surmised that it did not matter which country invested in Tajikistan
as “all money smells the same,” alluding to the fact that the country had to
take what it could get (Hoagland, 2006c). In a discussion with Hoagland only
days before Ahmadinejad’s arrival, Nazarov continued his somewhat blunt,
yet pragmatic assessment of international relations. Speaking openly and
frankly about Iran, Nazarov claimed his government had “no special love”
for Iran, and simply required its economic assistance above all else. Further-
more, Nazarov also highlighted his fear that Ahmadinejad would make the
visit “overly political” and expressed a strong desire for the visit to stick to
the safe realms of discussions on bilateral economic cooperation. As a veteran
politician who had displayed a consistent and categorical disdain for Tajiki-
stan’s Islamic opposition, it is no surprise that Nazarov would hold anti-
Iranian views; and it seems he had not forgotten Iran’s support for the oppo-
sition during the civil war; remarking to Hoagland that Iran’s infrastructure
projects in the country were “compensation for the enormous damage” it had
done during Tajikistan’s early days of independence—a direct reference to
Iran’s previous support of the IRP and other opposition groups during the
Tajik Civil War period (Hoagland, 2006a).
Unfortunately for Nazarov his worst fears became a reality. Coinciding
with Ahmadinejad’s visit to Tajikistan was the Israeli decision to launch a
military offensive into Lebanon, ostensibly to attack Hezbollah militants, a
group that Iran had provided significant financial and military support for.
Ahmadinejad effectively drew Rahmon into this dispute by using his meeting
with the Tajik president as a platform to criticize Israel, and to pressure Rah-
mon into signing a joint declaration condemning Israel’s use of force against
Lebanon. In unfamiliar territory, Rahmon stressed that Tajiks as part of the
“larger community of Muslims of the world” were of the opinion that the
Israeli-Hezbollah dispute had to be solved through a “political route” and
that Lebanon’s territorial integrity and independence had to be respected
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(“Iranian President in Tajik Capital,” 2006). Even Foreign Minister Nazarov
for good measure conducted a volte-face from his earlier private comments to
U.S. Ambassador Hoagland, urging the Israelis to put an end to what he
called a “real war that has already killed more than 400 peaceful Lebanese
residents” (“Iran: Middle East Overshadows,” 2006).
The unexpected and uncharacteristic Tajik political commentary on Middle
Eastern affairs overshadowed what was meant to be a rather low key bilateral
set of discussions surrounding agreements in the areas of law and order,
tourism, free economic, and trade zones, and preferential tariff deals (“Iran:
Middle East Overshadows,” 2006). Instead, Tajikistan found itself at the cen-
ter of an international issue that was of little concern to its national interests.
However, economic imperatives outweighed the risks of alienating Iran and
its new president on his first state visit to the country. Rahmon and Naza-
rov’s hope that bilateral talks would stick firmly to discussions on cultural,
commercial, and assistance matters quickly fell by the wayside; and matters
only got worse on the second day of Ahmadinejad’s visit where he was slated
to meet Afghan President Karzai and Rahmon in trilateral discussions (Hoag-
land, 2006b).
The first trilateral meeting between post-Taliban Afghanistan, Tajikistan,
and Iran had been anxiously awaited. Karzai had originally arranged to meet
Rahmon and Ahmadinejad in Tehran in January of 2006 but after
“consultation” with the United States withdrew due to “domestic issues”—a
not so subtle indication that he was pressured by U.S. officials not to attend
the meeting (Hoagland, 2006b). Nonetheless, Karzai only played a very low
key role during the meeting and his arrival late in the afternoon at Dushanbe
from Kabul led to only a short overlap with Ahmadinejad’s time in Tajiki-
stan’s capital (Joharifard, 2008, p. 74). Despite the international press breath-
lessly reporting what seemed like an intensification of political relations
between these three so-called “Persian states,” very little of substance came
out of the meeting: the three leaders signing a number of memoranda of
understanding in the realms of economic cooperation and also in combatting
drug trafficking and political terrorism (Golovina, 2006). Furthermore, Ahma-
dinejad advocated a range of different cultural projects, which would
“reconnect” the three states’ peoples.
At the close of the meeting, Ahmadinejad declared simplistically and some-
what falsely, given the ethnic, religious, and linguistic demographics of all
three states, that they were “united by a common language, culture, and reli-
gion. It’s impossible to divide us by borders or talk about our differences. . .
There are a number of global threats that unite us. Security in Tajikistan and
Afghanistan increases Iran’s security” (Golovina, 2006). In reality however,
Afghanistan’s strong links and reliance upon the United States to promote its
security, as well as Tajikistan’s continued relationship with the United States
through basing agreements and cooperation, made such a statement awkward
for both the leaders of Afghanistan and Tajikistan. However, it would be the
discursive salvo Ahmadinejad would launch against the United States during
this press conference that would send Tajik officials into a state of further dis-
comfort and annoyance.
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Addressing a large assembly of journalists to announce the agreements that
the three leaders had signed, Ahmadinejad waited for both Karzai and Rah-
mon to exit the press conference before launching into a tirade against the
United States, declaring that now he could finally “tell you what I really
think,” claiming that the United States had “spread slander” against Iran to
“conceal its own shortcomings.” According to American diplomatic cables,
Nazarov had stressed to Hoagland that he had asked Ahmadinejad not to
use the meeting as a platform to criticize the United States; however, he could
not guarantee that Ahmadinejad would not respond to the “provocations” of
the assembled journalists. In later discussions with American diplomats, Naz-
arov seemed genuinely shocked that Ahmadinejad had used this visit to Taji-
kistan to express such grievances (Hoagland, 2006b).
The visit by Ahmadinejad to Dushanbe and the subsequent controversy he
stirred was a microcosm of Iran’s relations with Tajikistan throughout his
presidency. Every trip by Ahmadinejad to Tajikistan, and Rahmon to Iran
revolved around the signing of numerous memoranda of understanding,
promises of large-scale economic investment, and the emphasis upon the
apparent political and cultural closeness of the two states. Unfortunately, as
can be seen in the above visit by Ahmadinejad to Tajikistan, a number of
issues plagued interstate relations between Iran and Tajikistan and would
continue to do so for a number of years to come.
Iranian-Tajik Economic Relations
Nowhere was the disjuncture between rhetoric and the reality of Iran’s
relations with Tajikistan clearer than in the realm of economic policy and
engagement. The Anzob tunnel continued to be a festering wound of exposed
rebar and jagged surfaces, which seriously harmed political goodwill toward
Iran. This was apparent when in 2013, seven years after project was opened
to great fanfare by Ahmadinejad, Tajik Transport Minister Nizom Hakimov
declared that he preferred that Iran did not complete the project and that
“We wanted to involve Chinese experts to finish the construction of the tun-
nel; however, some political considerations did not allow us to do so. . .I
would like to choose a Chinese company, as it is very difficult to work with
Iranian companies. They say one thing but act very differently” (“Iranian
Company to Complete Tunnel,” 2013). Hakimov’s statement was a damning
indictment of Iran’s actions in relation to Anzob,15 however, there were also a
litany of other Iranian projects and proposals which were also held hostage
to mismanagement, political manipulation, corruption, underfunding, and the
impact of international sanctions that stifled Iran’s capabilities to deliver on
its economic promises.16
The issues surrounding Iranian economic engagement with Tajikistan were
evident in the case of its largest Tajik investment, the Sangtuda 2 hydroelec-
tric plant. Sangtuda 2 was viewed by Iranian officials as a showcase of Ira-
nian engineering mastery as well as evidence of Iran’s predominant economic
role in Tajikistan.17 The Tajiks hoped that Sangtuda 2 would be only the first
of many Iranian projects which could fulfill the country’s hydroelectric ambi-
tions and provide the country with much needed economic independence by
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lowering its reliance upon neighboring, energy-rich Uzbekistan. Very quickly,
however, Sangtuda 2 ran years behind schedule and created significant diffi-
culties in Iran-Tajik relations. Initially it was hoped that the project would be
finished before Khatami left office in 2005,18 however, construction did not
even begin until 2008, with the contract only awarded to Iranian state-owned
company Farab in 2007 (Daly, 2007). Although the main factor behind this
delay was the need to secure funds and navigate through Iran’s and Tajiki-
stan’s byzantine and inefficient bureaucracies, later delays came with the
inability to ship construction materials from Iran to Tajikistan via Uzbekistan,
a state that had consistently displayed hostility toward both Tajikistan and
Iran throughout the post-Soviet period.19
With these delays in construction came increased tension between Iranian
and Tajik elites as well as continued questions as to the ability of poverty-
stricken Tajikistan to pay back the debts it owed to Iran for the building of
the dam.20 This tension burst out into the open following the opening of
Sangtuda 2 in September 2011. Although Ahmadinejad and Rahmon inaugu-
rated the project to much fanfare, it was not fully completed, with only one
of the plant’s two 110 MW turbines operating. After further delays which
have never been fully explained, Iran planned to finally open the second tur-
bine of Sangtuda 2 in February 2013. However, after Barqi Tojik—Tajikistan’s
national energy provider—was unable to pay for the supply of electricity
being produced from the hydroelectric station and pay arrears amounting to
USD 12 million to the Iranian operators, leading to Ahmadinejad postponing
his visit (Trilling, 2014). In lieu of this payment Iran took the drastic step of
shutting down the station in winter 2013, which only exacerbated Tajikistan’s
energy crisis (Ergasheva, 2014). Despite earlier claims by Rahmon that
Sangtuda 2 was an “outstanding example of cooperation between Tajikistan
and Iran,” and was evidence of the “rapid development and good future of
constructive cooperation between our countries” (“Tajik Leader Praises Coop-
eration,” 2011). The facts on the ground told a different story. Sangtuda 2
remained an economic and political debacle both for the Tajiks who had
expected the project to begin fully operating over a half a decade earlier, and
to the Iranian government and its state run companies who had lost a signifi-
cant amount of money on building and operating the project.
Despite the issues that surrounded Sangtuda 2, Iran continued to publicly
express a strong willingness to invest in other large-scale hydroelectric proj-
ects in Tajikistan. For instance, Iranian Ambassador to Tajikistan Ali Ashgar
Sherdoust proclaimed to local media that Iran would be “involved in the con-
struction of the Roghun hydroelectric power station, both at the governmental
level and through the private sector” (“Tajikistan: Iran to the Rescue,” 2009).
The ability for Iran to undertake such a large project, which was slated to
cost between USD 2 and 6 billion was fanciful at best and it is highly likely
that Sherdoust was engaging in nothing more than a game of political one-
upmanship after Russia had backflipped on earlier commitments to fund
Roghun’s construction (Kucera, 2013b). Only adding to the Iran’s publicly
professed economic commitments was the Iranian construction company Far-
ab’s declaration that following the construction of Sangtuda 2 it would begin
construction on the Ayni hydroelectric project.21
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At the time of writing however, Farab, a company with strong links to the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC) has done very little to fulfill its previ-
ously made commitments.22 In the wake of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC),
and the widening of sanctions23 upon Iranian companies linked with the IRGC,
it became extremely difficult and far-fetched to say the least for such Iranian
companies to invest in Tajikistan.24 The impact of these sanctions can be seen in
the fact that in 2012, Iran’s state investments in Tajikistan had dropped to USD
26 million making it the fifth biggest state investor in the country from a peak
when Iran was Tajikistan’s leading state investor in 2010 with investment fig-
ures amounting to USD 65.2 million.25 Furthermore, Tajikistan’s at times shady
dealings with Iranian businessmen and companies that acted as fronts for IRGC
business interests had provided the Tajik government with unwanted interna-
tional attention, and led to serious misgivings within the Barack Obama admin-
istration toward Tajikistan’s unregulated financial sector, which had provided a
foothold for Iran to avoid sanctions.26
The questioning of Iran’s economic promises and the Tajiks’ unhappiness
toward the standard of Iranian investments was a consistent theme that was
raised by Tajik elites in private discussions with the author. Iran’s empty
promises in the construction of a number of large-scale projects, as well as
the inability to complete smaller projects such as a three tower residential
and commercial complex27 that now sits as a wasted concrete shell in Dush-
anbe’s urban heart, was the subject of much anger among Tajikistan’s intelli-
gentsia, and denial and embarrassment among Iranian experts interviewed.28
Furthermore, despite Iranian and Tajik leaders alike publicly lauding the level
of economic interaction and trade between the two states, which had
increased from a bilateral level of USD 134.6 million in 2006 to USD 220 mil-
lion in 201129; Iran outside of its large state-driven investments was only a
minor player in Tajikistan’s broader economy. Privately run Iranian compa-
nies for instance, only invested USD 1 million into Tajikistan’s economy in
2009, a figure that paled in comparison to Iran’s Kazakhstani, Chinese, and
Russian business rivals.30
Among the failures, there were success stories. For instance, according to
official Tajik statistics there were a total of 52 Tajik-Iranian joint ventures
operating in the country in 2009, and 20 Iranian companies operating in a
number of areas such as livestock, poultry production, and detergent mak-
ing.31 The most successful of these ventures included large poultry farms
operating in the Sughd and Khatlon provinces, and a tractor manufacturing
plant and vegetable oil factory in Dushanbe. Although not of the grand-scale
hoped for or claimed by Iran’s president, it appeared that if Iranian policy
planners had accepted their limited capabilities and stuck to much more real-
istic economic goals in Tajikistan, Iran could have achieved much more suc-
cess and been the recipient of substantial political goodwill.
Iranian-Tajik Cultural Engagement
Apart from Ahmadinejad’s strong push to improve Iran’s economic posi-
tion in Tajikistan was his focus on cultural diplomacy. Ahmadinejad often
claimed that Iran and Tajikistan were like “one spirit in two bodies” and that
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the two states’ “single history, culture, tradition and religion” had made
them inseparable (Kroth, 2012). Such rhetoric flew in the face of the widely
held view within the international community that Ahmadinejad was nothing
more than an Islamist hardliner or revolutionary fanatic, and exposed Iran’s
pragmatic use of its national culture and history for political and strategic
purposes.32 Ahmadinejad sought to use Iran’s history and civilization as a
means to bridge political divides and to emphasize commonality with his
Tajik counterparts and as a means to avoid wider regional isolation in the
face of international pressures. Although warmly embraced by Tajikistan’s
intelligentsia, and viewed favorably by Tajikistan’s government who had con-
sistently sought to keep Iran’s ideology and Islamic proclivities at arms-
length, Ahmadinejad’s cultural diplomacy efforts were not free from the con-
troversies and issues that dogged Iran’s wider foreign policy agendas; and
unfortunately for Ahmadinejad his endeavors were often stymied by misman-
agement, over-exuberance, and lingering suspicions relating to Iran’s “real”
intentions.
During Ahmadinejad’s presidency, he firmly supported the extension and
promotion of Iranian arts and cultural festivals, and programs which sought to
bolster Persian language and literature in the country, many of which had
begun during the time of his predecessor Khatami. He oversaw the sponsoring
of Tajik intellectuals to travel to Iran, and provided stipends and funds for the
publication of their works into both the Persian and Cyrillic alphabets (Mal-
ekian, 2012, pp. 97–98). The Ahmadinejad administration also oversaw the
establishment of 17 cultural centers throughout Tajikistan where Tajik students
learned how to read and write in Persian, study the Koran, and also had access
to Iranian films, magazines, books, and other materials (Sanaei, 2011, pp. 270–
271; Sodiqov, 2011b).33
These programs were a continuation of policies and actions that had long
predated Ahmadinejad’s presidency and while continuing to support these
activities, Ahmadinejad and his administration also sought to institute much
grander plans, which would use Iranian culture and national history as a key
diplomatic tool to build and improve Iran’s political influence in Tajikistan
and the wider region. For instance, Nowruz—an ancient Zoroastrian festival
celebrating the beginning of the vernal equinox, which had been banned for
much of the Soviet period in the Central Asian and Caucasus regions—
became a cornerstone of Ahmadinejad’s cultural diplomacy efforts (Marat,
2007; Sanaei, 2011, p. 262). Although all of the Central Asian republics had
openly celebrated Nowruz since the fall of the Soviet Union, Ahmadinejad’s
administration encouraged state leaders within the so-called “Iranian plateau”
such as Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Kurdistan, Azerbaijan, and the other
Central Asian Turkic republics to use the occasion as a means to increase
political dialogue (Mirsanjari, 2010). The “International Nowruz Festival”
which brought these states together was first held in Tehran in 2010 and
2011, and held in the following years in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and
Afghanistan. The International Nowruz Festival became an institution for the
region’s leaders and was used as a means to strengthen regional stability,
and promote “brotherhood.” According to a number of Iranian political
experts this initiative was one of Ahmadinejad’s key regional foreign policy
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achievements and served a dual purpose in not only promoting regional
friendship and cultural commonality but also allowed Iran another much
needed international platform to highlight its political grievances and fulfill
its ambition to be seen as a regional leader (Dareini, 2010).
Another prominent initiative within the Ahmadinejad administration’s cul-
tural diplomatic efforts was the establishment of the Persian Speaking Associa-
tion between Iran, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan.34 This association stemmed from
the first trilateral meeting that took place between Rahmon, Karzai and Ahma-
dinejad in January 2006 and sought to promote political and cultural commonal-
ity between the three states as well as to discuss measures to address the
geographical, economic, and political isolation all three continued to suffer. This
somewhat informal association between the three states was often breathlessly
referred to as an “alliance” and a “union” among regional observers, and with-
out doubt Ahmadinejad was confident that building upon perceived notions of
cultural commonality this association could eventually catapult itself into the
realm of a political and strategic alliance (Medrea, 2008). Ahmadinejad’s enthu-
siasm for expanding political relations through the Persian Speaking Association
was shared, rhetorically at least, by Rahmon who hoped this initiative could
balance the influence and pressure of Uzbekistan, and provide Tajikistan with
its own regional grouping to rival the Turkish-Speaking Association made up of
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic (Mahmoudi, 2009). However,
Afghan President Karzai did not share his two counterparts interest in develop-
ing closer political links and displayed only very limited interest for what
became one of Ahmadinejad’s pet projects. Karzai was well aware that the
extension of the association beyond informal cultural links to a political or stra-
tegic alliance would be unacceptable to his American backers who continued to
bankroll his government and acted as a domestic security guarantor within his
country (Joharifard, 2008, pp. 77–78). Furthermore, Afghanistan as a multilin-
gual and ethnic state, where 35% of the population spoke Pashto made such a
project highly problematic. Apart from these obstacles the Persian Speaking
Association rarely instigated any policies of real substance and often descended
into nothing more than a talk-fest of over the top rhetoric and commitments to
cooperation, which sounded good on paper and at news conferences but often
failed in practice.
A prominent example of the association’s failure to instigate even the most
modest of agendas was the attempt to establish a joint television station,
which would air shared content and promote the three states’ so-called
“shared Persian culture.” Regrettably, this initiative became yet another sym-
bol of Iranian missteps in Tajikistan and the broader region. At the first trilat-
eral meeting between the three leaders in July 2006, Ahmadinejad had first
advocated this project35; but it was not until July 2008 that a working group
of Iranian, Afghan, and Tajik ministers inked an agreement on the establish-
ment of the joint television station, which would be headquartered in Dush-
anbe and televise programs and news from all the three states and begin
operating in the “very near future” (“Iran, Tajikistan, Afghanistan,” 2008;
Najibullah, 2008). By 2010, the joint television station was still not in opera-
tion, although it was claimed by Tajik Culture Minister Mirzoshohrukh
Asrori that the station would begin airing during the annual Nowruz
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celebrations in March 2010 (“Persian-Language TV Station,” 2010). When
interviewed by international news media outlets, Iran’s Ambassador to Tajiki-
stan, Sherdoust, claimed that the delays in the project had come about due to
“reservations” held by Afghan authorities toward the television channel and
that the issues would be “resolved soon.” Despite the claims by these two
political figures, the television station did not begin operations in March
2010, nor were the “issues” surrounding the project ever resolved.
Speaking two years later, Sherdoust said that the Tajik authorities now had
the television equipment and if they would allow it to be installed the channel
could start operating. Unfortunately, the Tajik authorities did not allow the
equipment to be installed, and by 2012 were demanding that the Iranian
Embassy pay customs duties totaling USD 400,000 for the importation of the
equipment which had cost Iranian authorities over USD 2.5 million to purchase
in the first place (“Tajik Customs Agents Hold Iranian Gear,” 2012). Tajik cus-
toms officials claimed that the duties would be waived if the equipment was to
be used strictly by the embassy; if not, however, the duties would indeed have
to be paid. At the time of writing the television equipment remains in a Tajik
customs’ warehouse and eight years since the initial proposal there remains no
joint Iranian, Afghan, and Tajik television channel to speak of. While publicly
the reasons for this delay have been put down to miscommunication, technical
difficulties, Afghan disinterest, and other seemingly “minor issues,” the real rea-
son came down to the fundamental differences that existed between Iran and
Tajikistan’s societies and forms of government.36 Tajikistan’s staunchly secular
government, despite the public professions to the contrary, neither had the
time, nor the inclination to support the programming of Iranian television con-
tent, particularly content that was religious in nature (Marat, 2007). This is con-
firmed by a Tajik expert who noted that:
The common TV channel for Iran, Afghanistan and Tajikistan - this so
called Persian, Farsi speaking channel has failed mostly because of the
Tajik position. . ..Afghanistan also hampered the project for their own
reasons. But the major obstacle was the position of the Tajik govern-
ment. (Tajik International Relations Scholar, 2013)
This view was supported in an interview with a former State Advisor to the
Tajik President who said he was made aware by Tajik government colleagues
almost immediately after the signing of the television agreement with the Ira-
nian government that the project “was impossible” to implement. In particular,
Tajik elites were concerned with the appearance of females wearing the hijab
on television and the influence of Iranian Islamic mores upon Tajik society:
“Iranian TV does not show what Tajik TV shows. A woman with an open face,
a working woman, a singing woman, a talking woman. . .Unless the political
issue – that is the [Iranian government’s attitude towards society] is not solved,
this television station will not be organised” (Former State Advisor to the Tajik
President, 2013). When asked publicly about this very issue the chairman of
the Tajikistan Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, Asadullo Rah-
monov declared that if the Iranian government insisted that Tajik female pre-
senters wear the hijab on programs airing on the proposed television network,
then “we will insist that Iranian female [presenters] do not wear hijab” (“Iran
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Delaying Tajik-Afghan-Iranian TV,” 2011). While Rahmonov claimed that he
had made these comments in jest, the reality is that Tajikistan’s government
continued to have underlying suspicions about Iran’s religious ideologies, and
the nature of its cultural influence in the country.
These fears were perhaps justified when considering that for nearly every
Iranian project that promoted strictly Persian culture and language were
others, which were seemingly much more opaque in their intentions and pri-
orities. For example, Radio Tajiki, also known as “The Voice of Khorasan,”
with its links to the IRGC, promoted Iranian government views on interna-
tional political issues and described its mission as: “Familiarizing audiences
with Islam and the message of the Islamic revolution and the propagation of
the pure ideas of the founder of the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
Imam Khomeini” (Vinson, 2012b). Furthermore, Iranian organizations such as
Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation (IKRF) which since independence has
been one of the major aid organizations in Tajikistan, expanded their presence
during Ahmadinejad’s term in office. In 2005, IKRF had supported 26,670
individuals; by 2008–2009 this figure had increased to over 33,643 individuals
under IKRF’s “protection” (Imam Khomeini Relief Committee, 2008/2009).37
As a humanitarian organization much of IKRF’s aid came in the form of
food, clothing, medical support, education, job creation enterprises, and schol-
arships, and also dowries for young Tajiks wishing to get married. Although
this aid was much needed and provided Tajiks with educational and other
opportunities, a number of Tajik elites interviewed, in particular a highly
ranked former foreign ministry official, perceived IKRF as a Trojan horse for
the spread of “Shi’ite values” in the country (Former Tajik Government Offi-
cial, 2013).
In addition to this expansion of the presence of IKRF, Iran also increased
the availability of stipends and scholarships for Tajik students to study in Ira-
nian universities and madrassas, which caused consternation within the Tajik
government and contributed to behind the scenes tension among the elites of
both states. Responding to fears that Tajik students were being inculcated
with fundamentalist Islamic values, which could destabilize the country, Rah-
mon ordered almost 1,400 Tajik students studying in madrassas and Islamic
universities in neighboring countries to return home. Declaring that if Tajik
parents did not recall their children from foreign madrassas and Islamic uni-
versities the majority of the students “may turn into extremists and terrorists
in five or ten years’ time” (Lemon, 2010). Of these 1,400 students, almost 200
were studying in Iran. There was particular suspicion in relation to Tajik stu-
dents adopting Shi’ism in Iran and attempting to bring these values back into
the country by organizing study groups and other gatherings.38 The Tajik
government also cracked down upon Iranian educational efforts within the
country, ordering a local school run by the Iranian Embassy to expel 90 Tajik
students, as well as 150 Afghan students. The official explanation given for
the closure was that the school only had accreditation to teach children of
local Iranians, Iranian diplomats, and embassy support staff.
Seeking to tiptoe around these issues and not interfere in Tajikistan’s
domestic politics, Iran’s Ambassador to Tajikistan Sherdoust declared in an
interview (while also conveniently forgetting his own government’s
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interference in its citizen’s religious and personal rights) that he felt that
“beliefs and religion are personal matters and governments should not
obstruct people’s beliefs. . .Religion is a personal matter; no government can
take away my religion. I personally believe that governments should not
interfere with it” (Trilling, 2012). In conversations with a current Iranian
Ambassador of a neighboring regional country, who has had significant pro-
fessional experience in Tajikistan and the wider region, expressed great con-
cern toward the Tajik government’s position in respect to Islam, and while he
unequivocally declared that Iran did not interfere in Tajikistan’s domestic
policies on religion, he felt that the country had made the wrong decision in
its crackdown on Islam and in particular toward students wishing to study in
Iran. In fact, he felt that by instituting such anti-Islamic agendas, radicalism
would only grow in Tajikistan and contribute to future instability (Iranian
Ambassador, 2013). Most Iranian scholars interviewed felt that Tajikistan’s
hostility toward Islam would continue to act as a challenge toward Iran’s cul-
tural agendas into the foreseeable future, and that while Iran’s money was
welcome its influence was not, despite the brotherly public rhetoric to the
contrary.
Iranian-Tajik Political and Strategic Engagement
The Ahmadinejad administration, although couching the motivations for its
focus upon Tajikistan in terms of charity, cultural commonality, and concern
for its economically poorer Tajik “Persian brothers,” was driven firmly by
strategic and hard-edged political concerns. However, despite leaders in both
states loudly proclaiming that Iranian-Tajik relations constituted a strategic
partnership; substantive engagement, and measurable actions to support such
discourse was sorely lacking even by the close of Ahmadinejad’s second term
(“Tajik Leader Upbeat,” 2010; “Tajik President Meets,” 2008). Iran’s ability to
carry through on its leader’s rhetoric was very difficult in light of its political
and economic emaciation following the imposition of economic sanctions and
international isolation. However, a much more influential obstacle was Tajiki-
stan’s reluctance to go beyond words to deeds, and its continual and shrewd
efforts to take advantage of regional political rivalry to exact political and
economic benefits from Iran, bringing into question the rhetoric of political
and strategic closeness between the two states.
From the outset of his presidency, Ahmadinejad had declared that there
would “no limit” to Iran and Tajikistan’s relations and that the development,
security, independence, and dignity of Tajikistan was Iran’s top priority
(“Ahmadinejad Sees No Limit,” 2006). Ahmadinejad not only attempted to
promote close political ties with Tajikistan on a trilateral level through the
Persian Speaking Association with Afghanistan (the outcomes of which had
been quite modest), but also bilaterally encouraging Tajikistan to sign cooper-
ation agreements in the realms of antiterrorism, drug trafficking, and military
assistance. More important was Ahmadinejad’s apparent success in enlisting
Rahmon and his Tajik colleagues to publicly support Iran’s “right” to peace-
ful nuclear energy. Rahmon insisted on a number of occasions that it was
perfectly legitimate for Iran to pursue a nuclear energy program, and asserted
that a diplomatic solution needed to be found in the ongoing crisis between
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Iran and the West (“Tajikistan Backs Iran’s,” 2010; “Tajikistan Supports
Iran’s,” 2010).39 However, behind closed doors Tajikistan’s leaders were not
as resolute in their support of Iran as they were in public, especially in the
audience of Western diplomats.
As already noted, Tajik elites detested the prospect of finding themselves
ensnared in Iran’s political and diplomatic problems and consistently sought
to avoid being drawn into international controversy. Nonetheless, as the
nuclear dispute heated up, they would increasingly find themselves involved
in an international feud they wanted very little part of. By soliciting Iranian
economic investment, Tajikistan was expected, if not compelled by Tehran, to
support its nuclear program, while at the same time cajoled and often bullied
by officials in Washington to “do more” to convince Iran to come to the nego-
tiating table and to cool political and economic ties with the Islamic Republic
(Hoagland, 2006d). In conversations with American diplomats, Tajik elites
displayed incredulity toward Iran’s “reckless” stance on the nuclear dossier
and declared that they were against the prospect of Iran gaining nuclear
weapons; however, they were adamant that they would not confront Iran on
this issue because they needed Tehran’s financial and political support
(Hoagland, 2006e).40 If the United States would have been willing to fill the
economic gap provided by Iranian investment, Tajikistan’s public stance on
the Iranian nuclear issue arguably may have been very different.
Tajikistan’s somewhat contradictory and fickle behavior toward Iran was
also evident in other contexts such as in its tense relationship with neighbor-
ing Uzbekistan and its at times complicated ties with major patron, Russia.
Dushanbe and Moscow had rarely seen eye-to-eye with Uzbekistan, who had
since 2001, become a darling in the eyes of the West due to its prominent role
in the so-called “war on terror.” In 2005 however, Uzbekistan’s dalliance with
the West, in particular the United States, came to an abrupt end following the
“Andijan massacre,” which saw the Uzbek government allegedly kill hun-
dreds of people who had protested the imprisonment of 23 men who had
been accused of Islamic extremism. The U.S. criticism of Uzbekistan’s han-
dling of this incident and of its abysmal human rights record led to Uzbeki-
stan unceremoniously kicking out American military forces based in the
country.
Sensing its growing regional and international isolation, the Karimov
regime quickly sought out new allies, and in an about face attempted to
realign itself with Russia. These Uzbek actions were unsurprisingly welcomed
in Moscow, where Russian elites were happy to again bring Uzbekistan
within their political orbit, following the consistent setbacks Russia had faced
in Central Asia following the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan. However, the
potential warming of ties between Tajikistan’s major foe and its traditional
security guarantor created shockwaves in Dushanbe where there was a fear
that Moscow was turning its back on Tajikistan in favor of Uzbekistan.41
Such fears were placed into sharp relief following Uzbek President Kari-
mov’s highly touted visit to Moscow at the end of 2007, in the midst of mas-
sive energy shortages and a food crisis caused partly by unilateral Uzbek
blockades of Tajikistan’s borders and energy grid. Following Karimov’s visit
to Moscow, Rahmon also sought out new partners, and in a surprise move
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went to Tehran where he solicited Iranian political and economic support for
his country. This visit was portrayed as a major development by the Tajik
media, who lauded Iran’s contributions to alleviating Tajikistan’s energy and
food shortages (US Embassy, 2008). Abdulloh Rahnamo of Tajikistan’s Strate-
gic Research Center noted that Russia had historically been Tajikistan’s “best
partner” but its changing position in regard to Uzbekistan had left the coun-
try in a “hard situation,” meaning that Tajikistan’s government desperately
required new international partners, and was much more amenable to pursu-
ing relations with Iran in this context (US Embassy, 2008).
Adding impetus for Tajikistan to continue pursuing strong ties with Iran
was the Russian company Rosul’s decision to cancel its investment in the
Roghun hydroelectric project in 2008. Roghun had been intensely opposed by
Uzbekistan, who feared that the size and scale of the project, which would
have been one of the largest hydroelectric dams in the world, could threaten
downstream water flows into the country and ruin its most important indus-
try, cotton farming. Tajik experts viewed the decision by Rosul to cancel the
contract as only a further symbol of Russia’s “siding with” Uzbekistan in its
long running feud with Tashkent over water and energy supplies (Nourzha-
nov, 2012, p. 371). This decision by Moscow only accentuated the apparent
rift between Tajikistan and Russia, leading Rahmon to cancel a meeting with
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in early 2009, while inviting Iranian
trade and defense ministers to Dushanbe in a not so subtle nod toward Teh-
ran at Moscow’s expense (Najibullah, 2009).
Tajikistan’s courting of Iran to balance the threat of Uzbekistan and to
perhaps step into the breach left by Moscow’s warming relations with
Tashkent was duly accepted by Iran. Whereas former Iranian presidents
Khatami and Rafsanjani had largely attempted to take a neutral stance in
the plethora of Central Asian political squabbles and not involve Iran in
the seemingly never ending disputes between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan,
Ahmadinejad and his colleagues showed no such restraint. Ahmadinejad
strongly supported the construction of the Roghun and Ayni hydroelectric
power projects, which had been aggressively opposed by Tashkent, and
also was a strong critic of Uzbekistan’s blockade of Tajikistan. Iran’s strong
support of Tajikistan was evident in the comments made by Ahmadinejad’s
close ally, former First Vice President, and Presidential Chief of Staff Esfan-
diar Rahim Mashaei in response to Uzbekistan’s blockade of rail freight
into the country, and its opposition to hydroelectric projects. Mashaei dis-
agreed strongly with Uzbekistan’s stance on Tajikistan and stated that Tash-
kent could not view its relations with Iran separately from those with
Tajikistan. Furthermore, he declared that “the government of Iran stands by the
state and nation of Tajikistan. We regard this as a strategic policy and will not
desist from it. It is our policy to expand our cooperation with Tajikistan in a
strategic manner” (Nourzhanov, 2012, p. 372). The local media in Tajikistan
breathlessly reported the words of Mashaei and claimed that Karimov had
finally “been defeated,” but Uzbekistan continued its blockade, thus ignoring
what ended up being nothing more than empty Iranian rhetoric (Nourzhanov,
2012, p. 372).
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As tensions between Tashkent and Dushanbe continued into 2011, Tajik
Defense Minister, Sherali Khairulloyev shocked many when he declared dur-
ing a visit by Ahmadinejad that:
Today, if necessary, the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Armed Forces can
reach Tajikistan in two hours. . .We support each other under any con-
ditions and both friends and foes consider us as two friendly and
brotherly countries. (Kucera, 2011)
According to a number of Tajik experts, this statement by Khairulloyev
was not only pointed toward Uzbekistan, but also Russia which was in the
process of negotiating a new military basing agreement with the Tajik gov-
ernment. In comments made to Eurasianet, Arkady Dubnov—a journalist
and Central Asian expert—opined that “Rahmon’s dalliance with Iran is
aimed at Russia; telling Moscow that it has other friends who could protect
it, too” (Kucera, 2011). However, Iran’s inability to pursue a substantive
strategic partnership with Tajikistan was made clear only a couple of days
later, when a small contingent of Iranian soldiers was invited to attend Taji-
kistan’s Independence Day parade. As the troops embarked upon their jour-
ney from Iran, their flight was blocked from entering Turkmen and Uzbek
airspace. The Iranians were forced to reroute “ironically through Afghani-
stan, whose airspace is controlled by NATO and the United States” (Kucera,
2011).
Despite the Tajik government’s embrace of Iran, elites in Dushanbe knew
that without Moscow’s military and political support the country would be
placed at the mercy of a much stronger Uzbekistan and would also leave it
much more open to instability emanating from its southern Afghan border.
Despite what was a bumpy patch in relations with Russia, Moscow’s integral
role in Tajikistan was confirmed in October 2013, when the Tajik parliament
ratified a deal extending Russia’s military presence in the country for another
three decades. While numerous defense pacts and cooperation agreements
were signed throughout Ahmadinejad’s presidency, Tajikistan showed very
little interest in building substantive cooperation with Iran in this field. This
was aptly pointed out in an interview between the author and an Iranian
Central Asian Foreign Policy Expert (2013) who declared that:
We sign many agreements with Tajikistan, but I would not call Iran’s
relationship with Tajikistan as strategic. The Tajik government has not
and never will allow Iran to establish military bases there, they have
never sent their military officers here to Iran for training, and we
never have joint military manoeuvres. . .it is very difficult to say that
Iran and Tajikistan have a strategic relationship.
By the close of Ahmadinejad’s presidency in 2013, Iran remained a very
minor player in Tajik strategic affairs despite the public rhetoric to the con-
trary. Iran as a “strategic partner” to Tajikistan was much more a myth
than a reality. Instead, Tajikistan often used Iran in a manipulative fashion
to improve its strategic value and ward off regional threats, particularly in
the context of its relationship with Uzbekistan. In the Machiavellian world
of international politics Tajikistan, a small and insecure state,
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understandably put its own strategic and political self-interests above all
else, and it seems unlikely that the country ever seriously pursued a strong
strategic relationship with an Iran that was increasingly under siege and
isolated.
Conclusion
Although Ahmadinejad and his administration placed a significant emphasis
upon building multifaceted cultural, economic, and political relations with Taji-
kistan, Iran was largely unable to fulfill its agendas. The impact of sanctions,
international isolation, and regional rivalry often left Iranian-Tajik relations at
the mercy of factors far beyond either state’s control. It is also apparent that
despite the friendly rhetoric exhibited by elites in both states, tension and sus-
picion often lay just below the surface of the bilateral relationship. Tajikistan’s
elites while publicly stating their willingness to engage substantively with Iran
in all facets, were in practice less sanguine at the prospects of deep ties. Iran
was often viewed with caution among some segments of Tajikistan’s political
elite, especially those who held strong secular biases. Iran did its best to over-
come these suspicions by focusing heavily upon the cultural bonds that were
believed to exist between the two states and did make some strong inroads in
creating goodwill among Tajikistan’s public. Nonetheless some of Iran’s more
religiously ambiguous cultural programs and initiatives did little to prevent
suspicions that Iran held an Islamist agenda in Tajikistan.
While Iran may not ever overcome the Tajik government’s fears toward its
Islamic nature and political heritage, this factor played very little role in contrib-
uting to the underlying issues that have plagued its relations with Tajikistan in
recent years. Rather, the main factor that limited Iran’s interactions with Dush-
anbe was the consistent mismanagement of this interstate relationship by Ira-
nian political elites. Iran throughout Ahmadinejad’s presidency promised a lot
but at times gave very little. Many of Iran’s economic projects suffered from
funding issues, or technical shortcomings, which were ignored for the sake of
an often misguided desire to display that Iran was somehow Tajikistan’s
“foremost international partner.” Compounding this theme of mismanagement
was the fact that on almost every visit to Tajikistan by Ahmadinejad and his
cadres, a new political and economic commitment was made or an agreement
signed that Iran had little intention or ability to fulfill. These actions spoiled
Iran’s reputation among Tajikistan’s political elite, many of whom would often
question both in public and in private, Iran’s reliability as an economic and
political partner.
Unfortunately for Iran, the great hopes of a deep, multifaceted Iranian-
Tajik relationship have yet to come to pass. Although Iran and Tajikistan
share many common bonds, which will ensure relations into the future, Iran
has not done enough to use its cultural, political, and economic assets to best
effect in Tajikistan. Despite claims to the contrary, Iran remains a secondary
player in Tajikistan and does not wield the influence so often portrayed both
within Iran and the wider international community. Instead, Iran’s relations
with Tajikistan, particularly during the period of Ahmadinejad’s presidency
is a prominent, yet understudied example of Iranian foreign policy
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dysfunction, and its underperformance in a context and country where it
should be playing a much more substantial role.
Notes
1Ahmadinejad held six visits to Tajikistan during his eight year presidency.
2For discussion of the differing ideologies and interests of the opposition parties, see Khudonazar
(1995), Mullojonov (2001), and Nourzhanov and Bleuer (2013).
3For a full analysis of the IRP’s ideological influences and its links with Iran, see Nourzhanov and
Bleuer (2013, pp. 231–275).
4In the bluntest of terms, a former Iranian statesman with significant firsthand diplomatic experi-
ence in Tajikistan and Central Asia summed up the Tajik Civil War to the author as follows, “That
war in Tajikistan was a village conflict! It had nothing to do with Islam!” The official went on to
declare that although there were “of course Muslim forces present in the conflict,” overall the Tajik
Civil War had nothing to do with Islam, or much more broadly a “Communism versus Islam dynam-
ic” (Former Iranian Ambassador, 2013).
5Only three weeks after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, Iran’s Speaker of Parliament and
future President, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani made a historic visit to Moscow, signing a number of
trade, economic, and military technical assistance contracts worth almost USD 6 billion.
6For example see Keyhan’s stinging commentary which declared that the Iranian government’s
“wariness” to describe the war in Tajikistan as an “Islamic” conflict alongside the Iranian foreign min-
istry’s unwillingness to take an “appropriate position that befits Iran’s position as Islam’s leader” was
a miscalculation that would hurt Iran’s reputation in the wider Islamic world (“’International Silence’
on Tajikistan Assailed,” 1992).
7For instance, in 1996, President Rahmon accused Iran of being a training ground for “terroristic
activities.” See “Iran Denies Involvement,” (1996).
8The Tajik government had shelved earlier initiatives to instigate language reforms, and continued to
teach in the Cyrillic alphabet. Apart from an Iranian cultural center in Dushanbe, there were very few
opportunities for Tajiks to learn the Arabic alphabet. Debt issues and other problems often saw the cancel-
lation of flight routes between the two states. For example, see “Tajik Airline Resumes Weekly Flights”
(1998).
9Dialogue of Civilizations was Khatami’s direct response to the so-called “Clash of Civilizations” the-
sis that had been popularized in the work of Samuel P. Huntington. According to Huntington, the fault
lines of future conflict would be based on civilizational and cultural differences rather than ideological
ones. See Huntington (1993, pp. 22–49). Khatami asserted that diversity and plurality among civilizations
was a matter that could be overcome through dialogue and cooperation among scholars, thinkers, and
politicians of the international community. With this idea, Khatami sought to replace the centrality of
conflict in Iran’s foreign policy discourse to one of cooperation. For further discussion, see Hunter (2010,
p. 77), Hussain (2002, pp. 73–85), Pahlavi and Hojati (2010, p. 221), and Sariolghalem (2000, pp. 1–38).
10For example, Russia reinforced its presence in Tajikistan in 2004, with the 201st Motorized Infan-
try Division establishing a permanent base in the country. Additionally, in early 2004, Rahmon
granted Moscow military basing rights in Tajikistan “on a free of charge and open-ended basis” (see
Berman, 2004, p. 65).
11For an excellent and thorough analysis of the impact of Uzbek blockades and the geographical
difficulties faced by the Tajik economy, see Umarov (2007, pp. 107–140).
12In early 2003 for instance, Iran pledged USD 500 million to Afghan reconstruction efforts (Dob-
bins, 2010, p. 204).
13Ahmadinejad consistently proposed a “new world order” of multiple centers of power, which
could confront the “global arrogance” of the United States. Key to this “new world order” would be
the establishment of a strategic partnership between Iran and states such as China, Russia, and India
(see Kucera, 2013a; Hunter, 2010, p. 14; Vakil, 2006, pp. 51–65).
14The author experienced traveling through the Anzob tunnel first hand in June 2013. For an in-
depth description of its poor construction, see Trilling (2007).
15Iranian company Sobir had promised to provide USD 6 million to rectify the problems with
Anzob, but nothing had been done. According to the Iranian government, Anzob’s problems and the
delays in fixing them did not stem from Iran but were in fact due to power outages, cement shortages,
and heavy taxation imposed by the tax office in Tajikistan. See “Bahr Mabradar-ye az Faz 2” (2013).
16Iranian proposed projects were often so large in scale and ambitious that many experts inter-
viewed by the author questioned the ability of the Iranian government to carry out the construction of
such projects. Commenting on this issue, Sodiqov in a scathing article outlined a number of these
projects which remained unimplemented. The most notable of these projects were an “Industrial
City” and a USD 500 million cement factory in Khatlon, however, smaller projects such as health clin-
ics, a tourism college, and a university also seemed to remain in perpetual limbo. See Sodiqov (2012).
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17No discussion with any Iranian expert or political elite could take place without mention of
Sangtuda 2 and its importance to Tajikistan.
18Talbak Nazarov in conversation with the U.S. Ambassador to Tajikistan Richard Hoagland
declared that he had hoped that Sangtuda 2 would be finished before Khatami left office. See Hoag-
land (2006a).
19Uzbek authorities had instituted a rail blockade upon Tajikistan in 2010 in an attempt to stop the
dam’s construction due to fears it would stem the flow of water to Uzbekistan’s large cotton growing
sector. Although Iran threatened Uzbekistan with its own blockade on Uzbek rail cars entering Iran,
Uzbekistan only lifted the blockade for a short period of time. In response, Iran had to take the expen-
sive step of airlifting the plant’s transformers and turbines and other construction equipment total-
ling over 75 tons from Iran to Tajikistan, which further delayed the project, and highlighted Iran’s
powerlessness in exerting pressure on Uzbekistan.
20Under the initial agreement with Tajikistan, Iran had pledged to contribute USD 180 million
toward the USD 220 million project. To cover the costs in construction, Iran had intended to own and
operate the plant over 12 and a half years. However, with construction delays and cost over runs seri-
ous tension between Iranian and Tajik officials ensued and it was unclear if, when, and how this
money would be paid back to Iran. By September 2011, it was estimated that the total cost of the pro-
ject had blown out by a further USD 36 million. See “Ahmadinejad Says Iran” (2011) and Vinson
(2012a).
21Ahmadinejad was a staunch advocate of the 130 MW Ayni hydroelectric station, so much so, that
on almost every visit to Tajikistan between 2010 and 2013 he would either sign another commitment
to its construction or announce that Iran would start construction soon; much to the bemusement of
Tajik experts interviewed by the author. For further information, see “Ahmadinezhad Says” (2011)
and “Iran, Tajikistan Ink Agreement” (2011).
22As of July 31, 2014, the Farab website states that Ayni is still in the “under study” stage. See Farab
Energy and Water Projects (2014).
23According to some estimates the GFC led to a 41% drop in trade between Iran and Tajikistan in
2009. See Farrar-Wellman & Frasco (2010). Sanctions had a range of differing impacts upon Tajik-
Iranian relations. For instance, following the 30% drop in the value of the Iranian Rial in late 2012,
Tajikistan canceled flights to Iran due to the difficulty in converting currency and paying for aviation
fuel purchases. See “Tajik Air Cancels Flights” (2012).
24For further discussion on IRGC linked companies and Tajikistan, see Vinson (2012a).
25See “Iran 5th Biggest Tajik Investor” (2013) and Shodon (2011). Rahmon himself noted that sanc-
tions had prevented Iran’s participation in the Tajik economy. See “Tajik president says” (2012).
26Babak Zanjani, an Iranian businessmen who had close personal links with Rahmon, was arrested
following the election of Hassan Rouhani in 2013. Zanjani has been accused of laundering Iranian oil
money into Tajikistan to fund his business operations, which included, but was not limited, to a taxi
company, bus service, airline and bank (“Tajikistan: Where Iranian Money,” 2013) Aside from these
issues with Tajikistan’s financial sector, the Obama administration actively sought to discourage Taji-
kistan’s economic links with Iran. For instance, during a press conference in Dushanbe on March 27,
2012, Robert Blake, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs called on Tajiki-
stan and the other Central Asian republics to cut their links with Iran. When asked about the question
of Iran’s participation in regional infrastructure projects, Blake replied: “Let me just say that consist-
ent with America’s sanctions on Iran, the United States is encouraging all of the countries of the
region to avoid trade and other transactions with the government of Iran in order to pressure Iran to
engage with the international community about its concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. We
believe there are some very good alternatives.” See Blake (2013).
27This project known as the Burji Sulh was intended to consist of three towers, which would house
conference rooms, apartments, restaurants, and conference facilities. See Mannonov (2006).
28For instance, when asked about Anzob, Iranians interviewed often claimed that tunnel was com-
pleted and was of an excellent standard, and even though these claims were challenged by the author,
those interviewed nonetheless stood by their claims.
29Accurate trade figures for 2012 and 2013 are unavailable. Furthermore, figures quoted by Iranian
and Tajik news agencies are highly exaggerated, and their accuracy should be questioned. However,
it was widely reported that trade between the two states had hit USD 250 million in 2012, while the
bilateral trade amounted to USD 229 million in the first nine months of the 2013, of which Iran’s
imports contributed to USD 128 million of this figure. Iran’s imports constituted almost 90% of this
trade flow. See Observatory of Economic Complexity (2014) and United Nations Comtrade (2014).
30Comments made by Toghaimurod Hamdam, Chief of the Investments and Economic Reforms
Department of the Tajik President to the U.S. Embassy staff. See US Embassy (2009).
31Information given by Hamdam in US Embassy (2009). Despite numerous claims by Iranian and
Tajik officials, Iran’s economic footprint in the country was much more modest than advertised. For
instance, it is often suggested that there are over 150 Iranian companies operating in the country. For
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example, see “Envoy: Iranian Companies Implementing” (2013), “FM: Iran-Tajikistan Trade” (2013),
and “Tajik Parliament Speaker” (2012).
32For a full discussion and analysis of Ahmadinejad’s use of national identity in shaping Iran’s
relations with Tajikistan, see Clark (2012).
33The author visited an Iranian cultural center situated on Rudaki Avenue in Dushanbe in June
2013. This small facility offers free access to an adjoining library, and provides locals free tuition in
Persian language four times a week. According to staff, on a daily basis at least 10 students use the
facility.
34For an in-depth analysis of the Persian Speaking Association, see Joharifard (2008).
35However, the idea of a joint television channel had a long history, with Rafsanjani first floating
the idea in 1991. See “Afghan Government” (2010).
36Not to mention the differences with Afghanistan which is demographically split among a num-
ber of ethnic groups, the most dominant of which are the Pashtuns. Furthermore, Afghanistan’s
vibrant and comparatively open and well-funded media sector would place such a joint TV channel
at a major competitive disadvantage. Many political figures including Sherdoust also claimed it was
the Afghan government that had delayed the project. See “Afghan-Iranian-Tajik TV Project” (2011).
37Furthermore, according to Vinson the works of a number of prominent Iranian Shi’a clerics are
translated into Tajik Cyrillic and promoted by local Tajik thinkers such as Saidyunisi Istaravshani on
Tajik websites. Even the former Qazi Qalon of Tajikistan and deputy leader of the IRP, Akbar Turajon-
zoda who has had historically strong links with the Iranian government has had his religious affilia-
tions questioned. Many local Tajik elites claim Turajonzoda has converted to Shi’ism and is engaging
in “dissimulation” as a means to promote Iranian religious and political views.
38For an in-depth discussion of madrassas in Iran that are often frequented by Tajik religious stu-
dents, see Peyrouse & Ibraimov (2010). Apart from religious students, there were 630 Tajik university
students studying a range of different subjects in Iran, and 950 Iranian university students were study-
ing in Tajikistan in 2009. See Hasanova (2009). For suspicions of Shi’a, see “Tajikistan and Iran” (2011).
An interesting anecdote was provided to the author by a former Iranian foreign ministry official who
spoke about the issues Tajik religious students faced when returning from their studies in Iran: “I was
in Tajikistan in 2011, I saw a Sunni talib [student] from Qom, he was a Tajik. He said to me ‘when I went
to my village I was trying to do the same thing I learnt with my religion that I have learnt for four years,
I was called an infidel from two talibs who had returned to my village from Pakistan. They said that I
was a liberal and that I shouldn’t be there. They said I was an infidel, so I had to flee my village, because
I have been brought up in Qom with this mentality.” Further to these comments, this former official dis-
agreed that the ban on Tajik students studying Islam abroad was aimed at Iran. He felt that the Tajik
government was forced to impose a blanket ban so as not to cause too much of a ruction in relations
with individual states, such as Pakistan—a destination that many Tajiks who held “extremist” views
had gone to undertake religious studies (Former Iranian Foreign Ministry Official, 2013). The view that
this ban was also not aimed at Iran is also advanced in Nourzhanov (2012, p. 376).
39In a statement to the international media in 2012, Rahmon declared in the strongest terms his
belief that Iran’s nuclear program was indeed peaceful—“According to our data, the Islamic Republic
of Iran is not seeking to obtain or build a nuclear weapon. The Islamic Republic of Iran is on the path
of progress, the country is developing. . .All the issues, one way or another connected with the nuclear
issue, should be resolved only through dialogue and diplomacy.” See “Tajik president says” (2012).
40However, it is also interesting to note that there were rumors alluded to in the Wikileaks’ cables
that if there was a vote on the floor of the UN General Assembly in relation to Iran’s nuclear program
that Tajikistan would abstain from voting, which could be interpreted as a sign of Tajikistan’s non-
support of Iran’s nuclear program after many years of consistently voting against numerous interna-
tional resolutions against Iran, particularly in relation to alleged human rights violations. For
discussion, see General Assembly of the United Nations (2014) and Hoagland (2006d).
41For a further discussion of Uzbek-Russian ties post-2005, see Trenin (2007, pp. 75–136).
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